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Chapter 1
Evolution of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime 1945–1970
Introduction
The measures put in place to deter the spread of nuclear
weapons, more commonly known as the nuclear
non-proliferation regime, comprise an integrated network of
unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral treaties and
other standard-setting arrangements.  Collectively, these
measures provide a comprehensive framework for the
behaviour of states, international organizations and other
actors in the nuclear area.  These measures constitute a
global regime which has been evolving since the end of the
Second World War.
Early proposals for control of nuclear energy
In January 1946, the United Nations (UN) General
Assembly passed a resolution which established the UN
Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC).  The remit of the
UNAEC was to make proposals for the elimination of
nuclear weapons and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes under international control.  On 14 June 1946 the
United States submitted the so-called Baruch Plan to meet
the Commission’s objectives.  The Plan proposed the
following arrangements:
• international managerial control or ownership of all
potentially dangerous activities;
• an international organization which would have the
power to control, license, and inspect all other atomic
energy activities;
• an international organization which would have the duty
of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy; and
• an organization which would perform research and
development tasks in order to keep it in the technical
vanguard of atomic energy, so as to enable it to recognize
misuse of atomic energy.
The Baruch Plan was never implemented, due to radical
differences between the United States and the Soviet Union
over how to proceed.  During discussion of the Plan, the
United States moved to introduce unilateral legislation
aimed at maintaining its monopoly over ‘the use of atomic
energy for the national defense’.  The McMahon or Atomic
Energy Act was passed on 1 August 1946.  This Act
established the United States Atomic Energy Commission
(USAEC) as the sole owner of all fissionable materials and
facilities in the United States and prohibited all exchanges
of nuclear information with other states.
The issue of international atomic energy control was
revisited following President Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for
Peace’ speech on 8 December 1953.  It was stressed that the
new proposal was not a disarmament plan, but a bold
initiative to open the benefits of atomic energy to the world
community.  The main features of the proposal were to:
• encourage a global study of the most beneficial uses of
atomic energy for peaceful purposes;
• foster the view that the spread of nuclear weapons could
be contained more appropriately by international
cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy under
an international safeguards system; and
• reduce the destructive capacity of the existing nuclear
weapon stockpiles and promote positive dialogue on the
central issues confronting humankind.
‘Atoms for Peace’ had both a bilateral and a multilateral
dimension.  Between 1954 and 1962, when ‘Atoms for
Peace’ was officially terminated, the United States initiated
several bilateral technical assistance programmes involving
research reactors, nuclear fuels and equipment.
International negotiation on implementing the ‘Atoms for
Peace’ proposal began formally after the 9th UN General
Assembly, once the United States had allayed the Soviet
Union’s concerns about the level of international control
envisaged over national nuclear installations.  These
negotiations culminated in a Conference on the Statute of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the name
given to the new international organization, held at UN
Headquarters in New York during September–October
1956.  Following agreement at this Conference on the IAEA
Statute, the Agency was established on 29 July 1957.
The IAEA, EURATOM and nuclear safeguards
The IAEA turned out to be a different organization to the
one envisaged in the Baruch Plan or by President
Eisenhower in his 1953 speech.  From the outset, the IAEA
was unable to fulfil the role of reducing the stockpiles of
fissile material in the three then-existing nuclear-weapon
states (the Soviet Union, United Kingdom and United
States).  Neither did membership of the IAEA place any
obligation on a state to: refrain from making nuclear
weapons (as France did in 1960) or exploding a nuclear
device (as India did in 1974); accept safeguards on its own
nuclear activities; or, require that safeguards be applied to
its nuclear exports.
Until the mid-1960s, opposition from the Soviet Union
and India prevented the IAEA from implementing a
comprehensive safeguards system on a global scale.
Moreover, early hopes that nuclear power would be utilized
in abundance and create a large-scale demand for fissile
material were disappointed.  Consequently, there was little
demand for the IAEA’s services as a supplier of nuclear fuel.
The decision by the United States to supply plant and fuel
to Western Europe under European Atomic Energy
Community (EURATOM) safeguards also kept the IAEA
out of the only region of the world, outside the United States,
where nuclear energy was destined to play a significant role.
However, in 1959 the IAEA did begin applying ad hoc
safeguards to natural uranium that Canada supplied to a
research reactor in Japan.
It was not until 1961, when INFCIRC/26 was agreed, that
the Agency formally began implementing a safeguards
system.  INFCIRC/26 was the IAEA’s initial safeguards
document and provided the organization with its first
uniform safeguards procedures, which were applicable only
to reactors with less than 100 megawatts thermal output
(MW[th]).  In 1964 this document was revised to include
reactors over this limit.
On 1 January 1958, Western Europe also established a
regional nuclear organization within the framework of the
European Communities (EC).  EURATOM has since had
the task of co-ordinating nuclear energy development within
the EC and implementing a regional safeguards system to
ensure that nuclear materials are not diverted ‘to purposes
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other than for those which they are intended’.  The
EURATOM safeguards system covers all civilian nuclear
energy activities in the Member States of the EC (now
European Union [EU]), including those of France and the
United Kingdom.  The military programmes of the latter
states are excluded from EURATOM safeguards coverage,
however.
The move to internationalise atomic energy, and promote
it for peaceful use, also affected United States’ domestic
legislation.  In August 1954 the United States passed
another Atomic Energy Act which paved the way for the
USAEC to negotiate bilateral cooperation agreements to
encourage the global dissemination of atomic energy for
peaceful purposes under effective safeguards.
In 1958, the United States amended the 1954 legislation
to allow the transfer of information related to United States’
nuclear weapons to enable their delivery by allies within the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in time of war.
The Act also stipulated that more detailed transfer of
information and technology relating to these weapons would
be made available to those allies which had already made
‘substantial progress in the development of atomic
weapons’.   Only one agreement was signed at first as a
result of this latter provision, the 1958 Military Agreement
for Cooperation between the United States and the United
Kingdom, an agreement with France following much later.
As the IAEA’s new safeguards system evolved during
the early 1960s, the United States began transferring to the
IAEA its bilateral safeguards responsibilities for nuclear
plant and materials it had supplied to other states.  The IAEA
also gained new status during this period as a result of an
increase in the demand for nuclear power and as orders for
new reactors increased.
Fissile material cut-off and nuclear testing prohibitions
The idea of a fissile material cut-off was first discussed in
international forums in late 1953, albeit camouflaged as
President Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ plan.  At this
time a main concern of the United States was that the Soviet
Union would soon possess sufficient fissile material, and
thus numbers of nuclear bombs, to have a capability of
delivering a surprise ‘knock-out blow’ on United States’
military forces before they had time to mobilise.  One
obvious way of slowing down the Soviet Union’s capacity
for this action was to constrain the amount of fissile material
it had available for military explosive purposes.  A key
element of Eisenhower’s speech was, therefore, a proposal
that both the Soviet Union and the United States should
transfer significant quantities of fissile material to the
proposed IAEA for use in peaceful applications of atomic
energy.  This would have the consequence of reducing the
fissile material available to the Soviet Union for military
use.
This proposal was only implemented in a very limited
form.  It was replaced from 1956 onwards by a series of
more overt United States’ proposals for a total halt in the
production of fissile materials for military purposes.  These
were seen as part of a package of measures to freeze, and
ultimately reverse, the ‘nuclear arms race’.  The idea was to
start with a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and a
fissile-material cut-off, to follow this by measures to halt the
production of additional nuclear weapons, and finally to
initiate a phased dismantling of national stockpiles.  Given
the United States’ superiority in the number of weapons and
in the size of its stockpile of fissile materials at this time, the
proposals were greeted with little enthusiasm by the Soviet
Union.
From 1958 onwards the issue of a fissile-material cut-off
was relegated to a secondary position as attention focused
on negotiating a CTBT.  This latter measure was viewed as
a means for both halting the development of more powerful
atomic and thermonuclear weapons and stopping the
pollution caused by radioactive fallout from atmospheric
testing.
The negotiations on a CTBT occurred in the context of a
Soviet Union–United Kingdom–United States moratorium
on nuclear testing from 1958 to 1961, and against a backdrop
of calls for these three nuclear-weapon states, the only ones
in existence at this time, to engage in nuclear disarmament.
These CTBT negotiations did not result in an agreement.
The primary barrier throughout the negotiations was how to
verify compliance.  There was a failure to agree a system of
inspections and controls that could provide adequate
assurance of detection of violation, especially through
underground testing.
In 1963 the Soviet Union, United Kingdom and United
States did agree the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) — also
known as the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) — which
prohibited nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in outer space
and underwater.  This meant that future testing by those
states which signed the PTBT had to be conducted
underground.  The only prohibition on underground testing
contained in the Treaty was in circumstances where a
nuclear explosion caused ‘radioactive debris to be present
outside the territorial limits of the State under whose
jurisdiction or control’ the test was conducted.
By the time the PTBT was opened for signature in 1963,
the potential significance of a fissile-material cut-off had
been reduced further.  The measure was no longer regarded
as a means of constraining the Soviet Union– United States
nuclear arms race.  However, since 1964 several
developments have occurred favourable to the negotiation
of a fissile-material cut-off.  The first has been the creation
of both the IAEA and EURATOM nuclear safeguarding
systems.  In the case of EURATOM, all fissile materials in
the member states are theoretically owned collectively.
However, as noted earlier, the two nuclear-weapon states in
the EU, France and the United Kingdom, have a right to hold
back military materials from EURATOM safeguards.  In the
case of the IAEA, the desire to have ‘equality of misery’ in
the safeguarding of civil nuclear facilities led the
nuclear-weapon states to make voluntary offers to the IAEA
to place some of their civil facilities under safeguards.  This
has resulted in the IAEA applying safeguards to some
reactors, enrichment and reprocessing plants in these states.
In addition, the experience of the implementation of IAEA
safeguards to reactors and other fuel cycle facilities has
provided convincing evidence that clandestine diversion of
significant quantities of fissile materials from safeguarded
facilities is very difficult, if not impossible.
Nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) and measures of
restraint in specific environments
Several measures to prevent the nuclearization of specific
environments and geographical areas were developed in the
period up to 1970.  The first was the Antarctic Treaty of
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1959, which, among other things, included provisions for
banning all nuclear explosions and the disposal of
radioactive waste in the Antarctic.  This Treaty served as a
model for later measures because it sought to limit the spread
of nuclear weapons by preventing their introduction into
specific areas (a ‘non-armament’ provision).
The first NWFZ covering a populated geographic region
was created by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America (the Tlatelolco Treaty), which
was opened for signature in 1967.  Article I of this Treaty
obliges its parties to use all nuclear materials and facilities
on their territories exclusively for peaceful purposes and to
prevent:
(a) The testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition
by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by the
Parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone
else or in any other way, and
(b) The receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form
of possession of any nuclear weapons ...
The Tlatelolco Treaty also has two Additional Protocols
for signature by non-Latin American states.  Protocol I
contains provisions for those which have territories in the
geographical remit of the zone.  Protocol II involves
undertakings by those states which possess nuclear
weapons.
The original verification provisions of the Treaty
involved the establishment of a regional organization to
ensure compliance, the Agency for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (called OPANAL after
the acronym of its title in Spanish).  OPANAL was granted
the right to conduct special inspections in the zone, while
the Treaty also obliged its parties to negotiate safeguards
agreements with the IAEA to ensure peaceful use of nuclear
energy within their territories.
In 1967 the Outer Space Treaty was signed.  This
contains an explicit prohibition obliging its signatories ‘not
to place in orbit around the Earth, install on the moon or any
other celestial body, or otherwise station in outer space
nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction’
(Article IV).
Negotiation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
Between 1958 and 1961, Ireland sought to draw attention
within the UN to the dangers posed by additional states
acquiring nuclear weapons.  As a consequence, in 1961, the
UN General Assembly adopted what became known as the
‘Irish Resolution’.  This called for measures to limit the
spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries and for all
states to refrain from transfer or acquisition of such
weapons.
Negotiation of the text of the NPT was conducted via
three distinct channels of communication.  The first, and
most important, channel involved the Soviet Union and the
United States in direct bilateral contacts.  The second
involved multilateral negotiation on the actual text of the
NPT in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee
(ENDC) in Geneva.  The third involved the United States
and its NATO allies, who were concerned about the
implications of such a treaty for consultations on, and
planning of, nuclear defence within the Alliance.
Three concerns permeated these negotiations.  The first
was how to manage the proliferation potential inherent in
the increasing global numbers of large-scale nuclear power
plants.  The second was how to deal with the issue of the
transfer of nuclear devices from nuclear-weapon states to
their allies, an issue raised by the United States proposal for
a NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF). The MLF
concept envisaged a multinational nuclear force of surface
vessels or missile-capable submarines within a NATO
command structure which would be distinct from European
national nuclear forces.  Finally, the provision of adequate
verification of the prospective treaty had to be addressed.
To the extent that particular states were the focus of
discussion, it was industrialized states, such as Germany and
Japan, which dominated attention, rather than any states in
the developing world.
A breakthrough in the conceptualization of a
non-proliferation treaty came as a result of resolution 2028
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1965.  This
resolution incorporated five principles for such a treaty:
• the Treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might
permit nuclear or non-nuclear powers to proliferate
nuclear weapons in any form;
• the Treaty should embody an acceptable balance
regarding the mutual responsibilities and obligations of
the nuclear and non-nuclear powers;
• the Treaty should be a step towards the achievement of
General and Complete Disarmament and, more
particularly, nuclear disarmament;
• there should be acceptable and workable provisions to
ensure the effectiveness of the Treaty; and
• nothing in the Treaty should adversely affect the right of
any group of states to conclude nuclear-weapon-free
zone treaties.
Although this resolution provided a conceptual basis for a
non-proliferation treaty, agreement on an actual text proved
elusive.  In the Autumn of 1966, the Soviet Union and the
United States began bilateral discussions in an attempt to
resolve the outstanding issue of the MLF.  Language was
eventually agreed early in 1967 which effectively foreclosed
on the option of multilateral nuclear sharing within NATO.
Debate within the ENDC throughout 1967 focused on the
issue of adequate verification of the proposed treaty.  The
Soviet Union was concerned that the EURATOM
safeguards system would not provide adequate assurance
that states in Western Europe would uphold their
non-proliferation obligations.  Instead, the Soviet Union
wanted the IAEA to assume full responsibility for
safeguards in the region.  Wording was eventually agreed in
early 1968 for a specific paragraph in Article III of the draft
treaty acknowledging EURATOM’s safeguards role under
the NPT:
Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude
agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to
meet the requirements of this Article either individually or
together with other states [meaning EURATOM, emphasis
added] ... 
On 11 March 1968 the Soviet Union and the United
States presented a joint draft treaty to the ENDC and,
following amendments, this was endorsed by the UN
General Assembly on 12 June 1968.  The NPT was opened
for signature on 1 July 1968, and signed on that date by the
three depositary states of the Treaty — the Soviet Union,
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United Kingdom and United States — and 59 other states.
The Treaty entered into force on 5 March 1970. 
Security Assurances
During negotiation of the NPT, a major debate occurred over
the linkage between nuclear security assurances and nuclear
non-proliferation.  The non-nuclear-weapon states raised
two concerns related to this linkage.  The first was that if
states were to forgo the nuclear-weapon option by signing
the NPT, would alternative arrangements be made available
to ensure their security?  The alternatives discussed at the
time were positive assurances of assistance from
nuclear-weapon states in the event of nuclear threats and
negative assurances from the nuclear-weapon states that
they would not use their capabilities against
non-nuclear-weapon states.  Although demands were made
to include assurances of both kinds in the NPT text, these
demands were rejected.  However, the negotiating parties
did agree to include a statement in the last preambular
paragraph of the NPT which recalls that, in accordance with
the UN Charter, ‘States must refrain in their international
relations from the threat of the use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State’.
The second concern of the non-nuclear-weapon states
was that while allies of the Soviet Union and the United
States were covered by nuclear guarantees from the latter
states as part of their alliance relationships, states in the
non-aligned world had no such security guarantees.  These
concerns manifested themselves in a desire on the part of the
non-aligned states for global nuclear assurances, especially
negative ones.  This was because they feared that the
existing nuclear-weapon states would use nuclear weapons
on their territories.
There were other complications which made negotiating
any security assurances difficult at this time.  Many
non-aligned states were concerned that their non-alignment
would be compromised unless the security assurances were
provided by all the nuclear-weapon states through a neutral
body such as the UN, rather than on a bilateral basis.
Moreover, because not all the non-nuclear-weapon states
were going to become parties to the NPT, debate focused on
whether the assurances should be reserved for those that
were going to sign to encourage those outside to join, or
whether all non-nuclear-weapon states should be offered
assurances because, as some states claimed, the use of
nuclear weapons contravened the ‘spirit’ of the UN Charter.
To allay the concerns of the non-nuclear weapon states,
the three nuclear-weapon states parties to the Treaty, sought
a solution outside the NPT.  These efforts culminated on 19
June 1968 with UN Security Council resolution 255.  This
resolution contains positive security assurances committing
the Security Council and ‘above all its nuclear-weapon State
permanent members, ... to act immediately in accordance
with their obligations under the United Nations Charter’ in
the event of a nuclear attack against a non-nuclear-weapon
state.
Conclusion
By the time the NPT entered into force on 5 March 1970,
the basis of a nuclear non-proliferation regime already
existed.  It was the entry into force of the NPT, however,
which provided the regime with a central international legal
foundation upon which further elements could be built.
While the nuclear non-proliferation regime might still have
evolved further after 1970 without the NPT, it is unlikely
that it would have embodied as much international
recognition and legal force as it currently displays.
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